Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shaglawy
Sudan: The Imposition of Wills and the Making of Peace
By rejecting the truce proposed by the Quartet, the Sudanese army affirmed its strategic choice to continue the war until the rebellion is subdued, based on its conviction and past experiences that any ceasefire imposed without genuine conditions is nothing more than a cover for the militia to reposition itself and regain its political and military breath.
Although this stance may appear rigid to the region, it enjoys wide popular sympathy, for a people who have tasted the bitterness of massacres and violations in El Fasher, Bara, El Geneina, Wad Al-Noura, Al-Hilaliya, and Al-Sareeha cannot accept the return of that militia to the national scene under any political or humanitarian label.
The decision of the Security and Defense Council yesterday to proceed with general mobilization reflects a strategic vision to redefine the war itself as an existential battle for the survival of the state, not a struggle for power as some attempt to portray it.
The military institution, through its previous experiences, has realized that a settlement, amid continued foreign support for the rebellion and conflicting international wills, will not create a sustainable peace but will instead reproduce the crisis in an even more horrific form.
Therefore, according to observers, the Council’s decision is decisive in affirming that any ceasefire that does not include the withdrawal of the militia from cities and the collection of its weapons according to the Jeddah Agreement is a political surrender and will not result in a genuine, lasting peace.
Domestically, the Sudanese decision faces a dual dilemma between national legitimacy and political realism. The Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, stands before a difficult equation: if he accepts the truce under the Quartet’s conditions, he loses his popular and military standing; if he rejects it, he bears international responsibility for the humanitarian catastrophe. Thus, the balance between internal and external fronts now depends on a comprehensive national vision that must be pursued immediately to preserve the country’s sovereignty and maintain the political and diplomatic rhythm simultaneously.
In contrast, it does not seem that the Quartet will easily accept the Sudanese Security and Defense Council’s decision to reject the truce, but it is practically compelled to deal with it as a fait accompli. The Council represents the supreme sovereign authority in the country, and any attempt to bypass it or impose an external will upon it will face wide popular rejection. Moreover, regional balances have become too complex to allow unilateral pressure or settlements.
Washington realizes that excessive pressure on the army may push it toward new alliances with Moscow, Beijing, or Ankara. Therefore, it appears cautious in its steps despite its publicly tough rhetoric.
It has become clear that the American position seeks to recycle the crisis in the form of a “humanitarian truce,” while some regional parties—particularly Abu Dhabi—harbor an evident desire to reproduce the pre–April 15, 2023, situation, that is, to reinstate the militia as a political partner.
However, this endeavor collides with a wall of firm national will, as the Sudanese street has become more aware of the maps of conflict, ambitions, and the interests of foreign powers intervening in the country—powers that place their own interests above those of the Sudanese people.
The structural analysis of events and their repercussions also shows that the popular stance rejecting any integration of the militia is not based on emotion or revenge, but on political awareness rooted in the modern state experience in Sudan. The Sudanese understand that any “top-down settlement” that lacks justice and accountability will produce only a temporary peace, reproducing war in a new cycle.
The collective memory of the massacres of Wad Al-Noura, Al-Sareeha, El Geneina, and El Fasher forms what political science calls the “foundational memory of conflict,” which prevents society from accepting any recycling of perpetrators under the banner of political participation. Therefore, any peace that does not pass through transitional justice will remain a forced peace without roots.
What some decision-makers fail to grasp is that the war in Sudan is not an “internal” war in the narrow sense, but rather an extended geopolitical war—a proxy conflict over transnational interests, waged on Sudanese soil between opposing projects: the project of national independence versus the project of economic and security internationalization. Consequently, any truce that does not dismantle the regional structures supporting the militia will merely become a tactical pause during which the adversary reorganizes its ranks.
True peace is one made by the Sudanese people through an inclusive internal dialogue that transcends regional and international tutelage and begins with rebuilding a state that respects human dignity and separates the weapons of the state from those of the militia. Such peace requires serious deliberations, mechanisms of transitional justice, and a program governed by the country’s security, judicial, and legislative institutions.
Sudan’s chances of resolving the war today are greater than ever—not only due to the combat determination of the military institution but also because public opinion, both domestic and regional, has begun clearly rejecting the legitimization of the militia. Yet, this opportunity remains conditional on the ability to intelligently manage political and humanitarian challenges. Every military victory that is not translated into a national project to rebuild the state and establish lasting peace may turn into fuel for another war.
Ultimately, according to Face of Truth, Sudan stands at the threshold of a historic moment between the imposition of wills and the making of peace. The imposition of wills means the war is managed by external equations, while the making of peace means that Sudanese themselves own their decision and destiny. The path to genuine peace does not pass through conditional mediations or deceptive initiatives, but through the restoration of state sovereignty, the unification of the internal front, and the elevation of the dignity of a people who can no longer endure having a future imposed upon them that does not resemble their sacrifices.
Stay well and in peace.
Wednesday, November 5, 2025
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