In Sudan\u2019s Wild West, the Battle for El Fasher May Decide the Nation\u2019s Fate<\/p>\n
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By Mohamed El-Fadel<\/p>\n
April 11, 2025<\/p>\n
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EL FASHER, Sudan \u2014 The dusty capital of North Darfur, once a seat of sultanates and a hub of camel caravans, is now the frontline of a war that could unravel Sudan as a unified state. As the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo \u2014 known as Hemedti \u2014 push to seize control of the city, a deeper regional power play is unfolding, with stakes that extend far beyond Sudanese soil.<\/p>\n
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At the heart of the struggle lies a question Sudanese citizens and international observers must urgently confront: If El Fasher falls, what remains of Sudan\u2019s cohesion?<\/p>\n
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A Strategic Prize With Regional Implications<\/p>\n
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El Fasher is more than a city \u2014 it\u2019s a keystone. Positioned at the center of Darfur, its capture would grant RSF a territorial bridge across the west of Sudan, from the borders of Libya and Chad to the central heartland. The move would allow Hemedti to consolidate military and political power in a region rich in gold, uranium, and strategic border crossings.<\/p>\n
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It is not coincidence that the push toward El Fasher coincides with mounting reports of external support \u2014 notably from Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar and the United Arab Emirates. Haftar, who commands southern Libya, reportedly provides weapons, fuel, and logistical cover. The UAE, for its part, is increasingly seen as a patron of both Hemedti and Haftar, seeing in them tools to extend its geopolitical leverage across Africa\u2019s interior.<\/p>\n
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From Benghazi to the Red Sea: A New Axis of Influence<\/p>\n
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If RSF gains control of El Fasher, it would formalize a de facto corridor of influence \u2014 a \u201cgeopolitical crescent\u201d \u2014 stretching from the Libyan coast through Darfur and possibly into South Kordofan. This would give Hemedti access not only to Sudanese mineral wealth but also to logistical routes that circumvent traditional state control.<\/p>\n
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Analysts believe this is part of a broader UAE strategy to dominate natural resource channels and geopolitical chokepoints \u2014 including the Red Sea corridor \u2014 while sidelining regional rivals such as Qatar and Turkey.<\/p>\n
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\u201cThe fall of El Fasher would symbolize more than a military loss,\u201d said one regional observer. \u201cIt would mark the rise of a militia statelet, backed by foreign powers, at the expense of Sudan\u2019s territorial integrity.\u201d<\/p>\n
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A New and Troubling Alliance: Hemedti Meets Al-Hilu<\/p>\n
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In a startling twist to the conflict, reports have emerged of a budding alliance between RSF and Abdelaziz al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People\u2019s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). Al-Hilu, who controls swaths of South Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains, was long seen as a holdout for a secular, pluralistic \u201cNew Sudan.\u201d<\/p>\n
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His overtures to Hemedti signal a dramatic reconfiguration of the conflict\u2019s internal dynamics. What unites them \u2014 at least tactically \u2014 is a shared desire to weaken the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, whose central authority has been eroding since the civil war\u2019s escalation.<\/p>\n
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This convergence opens the door to a more ominous possibility: a contiguous zone of RSF and SPLM-N control, stretching from Darfur through South Kordofan, effectively slicing the country in half.<\/p>\n
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The Army\u2019s Last Stand?<\/p>\n
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For the SAF, El Fasher is more than a battleground \u2014 it is one of the few remaining urban centers in the west still under military control. Its fall would signal not just a military setback, but potentially the collapse of the western front.<\/p>\n
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From a logistical standpoint, El Fasher anchors the army\u2019s supply lines and coordinates tribal resistance networks. Losing it would leave the SAF exposed in Kordofan and the central states, while cementing Hemedti\u2019s legitimacy as the strongest military force in the country.<\/p>\n
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Why the World Should Care<\/p>\n
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While much of the international focus remains on crises in Ukraine and Gaza, Sudan\u2019s silent implosion has created one of the world\u2019s worst humanitarian disasters in recent memory. The capture of El Fasher would unleash waves of displacement, violence, and lawlessness \u2014 potentially transforming Darfur into a stateless buffer zone dominated by militias.<\/p>\n
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Moreover, such a development would embolden warlords and foreign patrons alike. The RSF-Haftar-Emirati triangle would represent a new model of transnational militancy, where national borders are less relevant than resource corridors and proxy alliances.<\/p>\n
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A Nation in the Balance<\/p>\n
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The battle for El Fasher may appear, on its surface, to be a local struggle. It is anything but. At stake is not just a city, or even a region \u2014 but Sudan\u2019s very identity as a sovereign, unified nation.<\/p>\n
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The coming days may determine whether Sudan remains a country, or becomes a mosaic of fiefdoms controlled by militias, fueled by foreign agendas, and forgotten by the world.<\/p>\n
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The people of Sudan, and their allies abroad, must not let El Fasher fall \u2014 not without understanding what it means.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In Sudan\u2019s Wild West, the Battle for El Fasher May Decide the Nation\u2019s Fate By Mohamed El-Fadel April 11, 2025 EL FASHER, Sudan \u2014 The dusty capital of North Darfur, once a seat of sultanates and a hub of camel caravans, is now the frontline of a war that could unravel Sudan as a unified …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":10874,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[20],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11104"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=11104"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11104\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11106,"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11104\/revisions\/11106"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/10874"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=11104"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=11104"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aswatnews.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=11104"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}