Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shglawi<\/p>\n
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Haftar and the New Sudanese Calculations<\/p>\n
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The morning of June 10 was far from ordinary in the context of Sudan\u2019s war, now entering its third year. It marked a significant and dangerous escalation with the announcement by the Sudanese Armed Forces that border points within the Sudan-Egypt-Libya triangle had come under joint attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), backed directly by Libyan General Khalifa Haftar\u2019s forces\u2014specifically his “Salafist Brigade.”<\/p>\n
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This development represents a qualitative shift, signaling a possible transition of the Sudanese conflict from an internal war to a broader regional entanglement, where interests, ambitions, and power struggles intertwine.<\/p>\n
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According to Sudan News Platform, Haftar\u2019s support for the rebel militia went beyond battlefield coordination. Weapons and equipment were reportedly transported through Kufra, and Emirati-supplied surveillance drones were used, in addition to IL-76TD cargo planes seen operating in the area. These indicators suggest that the attack was a calculated move, part of a broader plan formulated in regional power centers that have long supported the militia\u2019s war effort, seeking to reshape the balance of power after RSF losses in North Darfur, West Kordofan, White Nile, and Khartoum.<\/p>\n
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The contested border triangle has always been a sensitive flashpoint where the interests of Khartoum, Cairo, and Tripoli intersect. Although the attack was executed by Libyan and Sudanese rebel hands, the invisible hands of regional actors\u2014particularly the UAE\u2014appear behind the curtain. Abu Dhabi is increasingly accused of managing the RSF\u2019s logistical and financial networks via southern Libya, especially after the traditional supply routes through Chad were disrupted in recent months.<\/p>\n
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Against this backdrop, a notable development came from Chad. President Mahamat Idriss D\u00e9by sent a congratulatory Eid message to Sudan\u2019s Sovereign Council leader, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. While seemingly routine, the message held political significance, as it marked the first official contact between the two nations after months of strained relations, during which Sudan accused Chad of sheltering RSF fighters and turning a blind eye to arms transits.<\/p>\n
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This gesture could be read as a Chadian attempt to de-escalate or gradually pull back from the conflict, likely driven by security concerns tied to the cross-border Zaghawa tribe and fears of the war spilling into Chadian territory. Internally, Chad\u2019s military has reportedly grown uneasy with its role in facilitating RSF support, especially under mounting Western pressure and a shifting international stance toward the Sudan conflict.<\/p>\n
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Though not officially declared, this Chadian retrenchment is seen by observers as a key factor prompting the UAE to seek alternative logistical routes\u2014ultimately finding a suitable proxy in Haftar\u2019s axis. Haftar offers a geographically and politically convenient channel that enables continued RSF support without high political cost, at least for now. Thus, the Libyan shift appears to establish a new supply line, potentially more robust than the waning Chadian route.<\/p>\n
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Egypt, mentioned by name in Sudanese military statements and ever-present by geography, now faces a complex dilemma. Haftar\u2019s forces, which led the assault on the border triangle, rarely move without coordination with Cairo and are considered its strategic arm in eastern Libya. Yet, the timing of the attack\u2014right after President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi\u2019s visit to Abu Dhabi, amid reports of Emirati pressure on Cairo regarding Rafah and Gaza\u2014has raised questions. Some speculate that the Libyan move, backed by Abu Dhabi, could be a subtle message to Egypt: \u201cThe south could ignite if you don\u2019t compromise in the east.\u201d<\/p>\n
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If these interpretations hold true, the conflict is not merely about supply routes or spheres of influence. It reflects a deeper power struggle within the same regional bloc\u2014between a financier (the UAE) and a geographic guarantor (Egypt), both of whom now realize that their diverging agendas may risk igniting internal conflict.<\/p>\n
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Looking ahead, several scenarios are possible:<\/p>\n
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The Sudanese army may continue its decisive response, as seen in recent days with airstrikes that inflicted heavy losses on the militia and its backers.<\/p>\n
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Alternatively, the new Libyan supply route might become a de facto reality that all actors must contend with.<\/p>\n
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A third possibility involves direct Egyptian intervention to rein in Haftar and align his actions with Egypt\u2019s interests and Sudanese cooperation.<\/p>\n
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A fourth scenario could see new players, like Turkey, stepping in to reshape the dynamics in their favor.<\/p>\n
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In this complex scene, Khartoum has a valuable diplomatic opportunity that must not be missed. If it can capitalize on Chad\u2019s message and turn it into a security negotiation track aimed at closing the western front, it would mark significant progress in weakening RSF\u2019s ability to regroup\u2014especially as the militia faces growing military pressure in Darfur.<\/p>\n
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If Sudan succeeds in restoring ties with Chad and strategically pressuring regional actors who support the rebellion, it could isolate the RSF regionally and open a new pathway toward peace\u2014especially as diplomatic movements begin to emerge between Ankara and Doha.<\/p>\n
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Wishing you all well and in good health.<\/p>\n
Saturday, June 14, 2025<\/p>\n
Shglawi55@gmail.com<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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