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The Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shiglawy … A National Committee to Confront U.S. Pressure

The Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shiglawy

A National Committee to Confront U.S. Pressure

Sudan-U.S. relations have once again returned to the forefront of tension after Washington announced new sanctions on Sudan, based on accusations that the Sudanese army used chemical weapons during the war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). However, the timing and political context require a different reading, revealing a qualitative shift in Sudan’s approach to U.S. pressure, in light of previous experiences.

In what observers described as a “smart” move, the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council issued a decision to form a national committee to investigate the American allegations, comprising the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and the General Intelligence Service. This step reflects the state’s seriousness in addressing the issue and carries significant legal and diplomatic implications. It underscores Sudan’s commitment to international agreements, foremost among them the Chemical Weapons Convention. It also sends a clear message: Sudan is a state of institutions that rejects diktats and preemptive criminalization.

The United States announced that the sanctions would take effect in June and include restrictions on exports and government credit lines. Although the economic impact of these sanctions seems limited due to weak trade relations between the two countries, their political timing raises questions. The sanctions announcement coincided with significant field progress made by the Sudanese army, prompting some observers to link the American decision to the military reality and consider the sanctions an attempt to reshape the balance of power and impose a negotiating environment that does not reflect the realities on the ground, but rather external desires representing the interests of the militia’s regional backers.

In this context, U.S. policy toward Sudan appears still captive to an old playbook dating back to the 1990s, which it reopens whenever its bets on local transformations falter. Since the fall of the Bashir regime in 2019, Washington has engaged in multiple attempts to reshape Sudan’s political landscape, starting with support for the UN mission led by Volker Perthes, through efforts to impose the “Lawyers’ Constitution” in its imported form, and ending with the framework agreement that was stillborn after it collided with Sudan’s complex and intertwined reality. With the failure of these “soft” tools, the U.S. administration shifted to harsher methods, including indirect support for RSF movements, which overthrew power in April 2023 and plunged the country into the throes of war.

This reading reveals an attempt to re-engineer the balance of power and impose a new negotiation climate based on external pressures that use human rights issues as political weapons. The United States realizes that a victory for the army would weaken its influence in the country and broaden Khartoum’s maneuvering space, possibly pushing Sudan closer to international partners like Russia or China—developments that do not serve the Western hegemony project in the region.

In this vein, the U.S. State Department announced restrictions on exports and government credit lines to take effect in June 2025, in an attempt to steer the political process again after the failure of the militia gamble. Notably, this indirect support for the militia also aligns with the agendas of certain regional allies, particularly the UAE, which views these forces as tools that serve its project in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. These policies have sparked criticism even within the U.S. itself, as expressed by Senator Sara Jacobs, who warned of Washington’s complicity with Abu Dhabi, affirming that U.S. policies mislead public opinion and do not reflect genuine moral values (Reuters).

American sanctions on Sudan are not new but rather a continuation of a series that began in 1993, resulting in its economic and technological isolation without achieving its political goals. In fact, they have harmed the citizenry and pushed them to engage with alternative countries like China. In this regard, the Sudanese government, through official spokesman Khalid Al-Ayesir, described the American accusations—according to SUNA—as “political blackmail” and “distortion of facts,” pointing to the similarity of these allegations with old scenarios, such as the bombing of the Al-Shifa factory in 1998.

To strengthen its moral and legal stance, the government has sought to present itself as a disciplined military force. Just two days ago, the Third Shendi Division handed over 66 children recruited by the RSF to their families via the National Council for Child Welfare, in the presence of representatives from government and judicial institutions. This event served as a practical response to the accusations and a fundamental contrast in combat behavior between the army and the rebel militia.

From the perspective of #Face_of_Truth, Sudan’s handling of the current crisis shows a gradual shift from reactive response to deliberate crisis management, balancing political defense and diplomatic containment, without compromising sovereignty or falling into the trap of isolation. While the United States still holds pressure cards, Sudan today is more aware of the history of such pressures and more prepared to chart alternative paths that respect its national decision. The open question remains: Will Khartoum succeed in overcoming these sanctions? The answer to this question will define the features of Sudan’s next phase.

Wishing you well and good health.

Saturday, May 31, 2025

Shglawi55@gmail.com

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