#Abdel Moez Hussein Al-Mukabrabi #Egypt’s National Security Strategy.. and Ensuring Stable Present Relations with Sudan..!!؟

Sudanese-Egyptian relations are characterized by solidity and a shared history dating back to 1820, when the two countries were one state with one destiny. Even after Sudan’s independence in 1956, relations between the two countries continued to develop, especially after the signing of the “Four Freedoms Agreement” in 2004, which stipulated freedom of movement, residence, work, and ownership between the two countries.

This is evident in the areas of cooperation and trade, where the volume of trade exchange between the two countries has grown, along with the presence of a Sudanese consulate in Aswan Governorate.
*In security*: there is joint cooperation in combating terrorism and smuggling.
*In the economy*: joint projects in agriculture, industry, and tourism.
*In culture*: cultural and educational exchange between the two countries.

There are challenges, represented by:
– *The dispute over the Halayeb Triangle*: an ongoing dispute between the two countries over the Halayeb area.
– *The challenge of the Renaissance Dam*: the impact of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on water shares between Egypt and Sudan.

Egyptian-Sudanese relations are characterized by specificity and deep understanding. Both countries seek to enhance joint cooperation and achieve economic and social development.

Therefore, Egypt is a state that looks deeply into the balance of national security in the southern Nile Valley and the future threats according to potential scenarios and upcoming conflicts over water and resources, especially those with which Sudan is rich.
Egypt wants a stable Sudan with a functioning state in order to deal with it through disciplined regional relations. Sudan is considered the depth of Egypt’s vital strategic sphere, based on the outputs of Egyptian intelligence vision, which takes Egypt’s strategic interests as the highest goal amid what it needs of anticipated resources in the southern valley.

This path is not subject to emotions or diplomatic romanticism. It is a strategic vision for Egyptian national security that governs its positions and political movement.

There are parties that benefit from disturbing the clarity of bilateral relations between the two countries, such as the State of the UAE and the “Qahat” client system. They seek to undermine that relationship in order to achieve rapprochement with Egypt for the benefit of their military wing, the Rapid Support Militia (RSF).

If Egypt had ambitions in Sudan, it would have allied with the RSF,
which announced that it would grant Egypt the right to invest and explore for gold in Sudan.
It said that Egypt has a debt crisis and a shortage of foreign currency, and “we possess gold mines, minerals, and enormous wealth.”

Egypt categorically rejected this, according to an official statement in which it considered that dealing with the wealth and capabilities of the Sudanese people would only be through the legitimate government and official national institutions.

If Egypt had ambitions in Sudan, it could have supported Hemedti and seized millions of acres under the protection of the RSF.
If Egypt had ambitions in Sudan, it could have sided with the RSF and pursued exploration for gold, copper, uranium, and rare mineral resources.

But Egypt chose to support the Sudanese people, according to statements attributed to Hemedti himself, through “unknown aircraft” and intelligence support.

Egypt’s ethics prevent it from allying with the RSF,
which Egypt described in its official statements as a “militia.”
Neither its history nor its ethics allow it to join hands with Hemedti’s militia.

If Egypt wanted to steal Sudan’s resources, it would have supported Hemedti against the Sudanese Armed Forces.