The Nile River represents a strategic resource for our country, in which considerations of water security, development interests, and regional relations intersect. Hence, the return of the Foula Dam project in South Sudan acquires particular significance, especially since the project is located on the White Nile and is linked to studies that predate the secession of South Sudan, which requires it to be viewed in light of shared water and development interests.
Last week, South Sudan’s Minister of Energy and Dams, Agok Makur, announced his country’s readiness to move forward with the Foula project, affirming that developing water resources is his country’s right. The announcement came amid practical steps that preceded it, including a visit by a delegation from the European Union and the Ministry of Energy and Dams to the sites of Grand Foula and Foula Rapids near Nimule during March and April of this year, indicating that the project has moved from the study phase toward practical action.
This step gains greater significance given that the estimated operational capacity of Foula Dam is approximately 1,080 megawatts, as part of a series of proposed hydropower projects on the Bahr al-Jabal, including Shukoli, Laki, Bedden, and Juba. This means that, in its future dimension, the issue is not about a single dam, but rather a system of successive hydropower projects along one watercourse.
But the paradox worth pausing over is that the project to invest in the waters of the Bahr al-Jabal was not an idea that emerged after the independence of South Sudan. In August 2008, three years before secession, the Sudanese government in Juba, through the Dams Implementation Unit, signed contracts for feasibility studies and designs for a number of dam projects in South Sudan, as part of a vision of developing water resources as an opportunity for development, electricity generation, agricultural support, and social stability. The signing ceremony was attended by President Omar al-Bashir and then First Vice President Salva Kiir Mayardit, while the contracts were signed by the Unit’s Executive Director, Minister Osama Abdullah.
This fact is an important key to understanding Sudan’s position today. What was a development project within one state before secession became a project in an independent state afterward, while the Nile remained a transboundary resource. Therefore, the dams in the south cannot be viewed as a threat in themselves; rather, their potential impacts have become a matter of water diplomacy and the management of shared interests between Khartoum and Juba.
Here, specifically, the Sudanese government’s position should be clear. Sudan does not object to South Sudan’s right to development or to investing in its hydropower potential, but it also cannot accept the management of a project located upstream of its watercourse without knowing its details, impacts, and operating rules. The issue is not the existence of a dam, but rather its design, storage capacity, method of operation, and whether other water uses are associated with it.
Despite the announcement that the dam is intended for electricity generation rather than storage or agriculture, this does not eliminate the need for technical and water-related coordination, particularly given the possibility that some designs may change during implementation, as occurred in the experience of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The way the dam is operated, its storage capacity, and the nature of water management are what determine its actual impact on our country.
Therefore, no prior judgment should be made about the project, nor should Sudan wait until its completion. Rather, Sudan must study its technical details at an early stage and clearly define its water interests.
From here, Sudan’s water security should not be measured only by the volume of water reaching its borders, but also by the regularity of flows, data exchange, knowledge of operating rules, forecasting of changes, environmental protection, and linking all of this to agricultural planning. The water that reaches Sudan begins part of its story outside its borders; therefore, protecting water security begins before the borders, not at them.
It is noteworthy that Egypt’s declared position is not based on rejecting the Foula project in principle. Cairo has said that it reviewed the project’s studies within the mechanisms of the Nile Basin Initiative and considered its impact limited and manageable, affirming that projects by Nile Basin countries can achieve development if preceded by studies, consultation, and information exchange.
This places responsibilities before the Sudanese government: What is Khartoum’s position on the dam that is geographically closest to it, and whose institutions were part of the history of its study before secession?
Sudanese silence at this stage is not a strategic option.
What is required of the Sudanese government is to announce a clear official position based on the history of Sudanese studies of the project and on the country’s current water interests.
This position should neither be a political rejection of a development project in South Sudan nor an open-ended approval of it. Rather, it should be a declaration of Sudan’s readiness to cooperate, coupled with a clear demand to obtain the full technical studies, review the project’s impacts, exchange hydrological data, coordinate on filling and operation, and ensure that no significant harm is caused to Sudanese interests.
Foula Dam, according to #Face_of_Truth, is not merely a power-generation project in South Sudan; it is a test of Khartoum’s ability to manage its water security with a proactive approach. What is required is neither rejecting the project nor accepting it silently, but knowing its details, assessing its impact, participating in its studies, and coordinating early with Juba.
With its historical experience in managing water resources and dams, Khartoum has an opportunity to transform Foula from a potential source of concern into an entry point for a new water and development partnership. Sudan’s water security is not protected through reactions, but through being present from the planning stage and building decisions on knowledge and shared interests.
Wishing you continued health and well-being.
Tuesday, October 6, 2026
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