Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shglawi
Al-Burhan Engineers the Arena for a New Phase
The decisions to restructure the General Staff, promotions, and retirements issued yesterday by the President of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, may appear to be routine administrative procedures in the record of the Sudanese military institution. However, the timing and context indicate something far beyond mere organizational arrangements—possibly a redistribution of centers of influence within an army that has just emerged from the most dangerous conspiracy in its history, one that targeted its very existence and that of the state itself.
Between names that were promoted and others retired, the outlines of a new phase are taking shape—one that is not limited to internal reordering of the Armed Forces but extends to the military’s relationship with other state institutions, and perhaps the political and security scene of the entire country. It is likely that the security, intelligence, and police apparatuses will witness similar steps, in what resembles a comprehensive restructuring of all regular forces, aligned with current changes and reinforcing the pillars of governance.
Everyone must understand that the Sudanese Armed Forces are no longer merely a regular institution fulfilling its national duty within a traditional hierarchical structure. Since the outbreak of the April 15, 2023 war, the military has been at the heart of the political scene and a focal point in a complex internal, regional, and international conflict. As the war continues, it has become necessary to recalibrate the military scene to ensure internal cohesion and consistency, and to prevent stagnation that has affected senior leadership due to the emergency situation and the prolonged duration of the war.
Key figures such as the Commander of the Presidential Guard, the Armored Corps Commander, the Military Intelligence Commander, the Moral Guidance Commander, and the Air Force Commander—among others—represent a complete re-engineering of the military theater, and perhaps the dismantling of power centers that emerged or expanded during the war. More importantly, they reveal a clear intent to reposition the military institution in a way that reflects its leadership’s vision for the “post-war phase.”
The significant and decisive decision to subject all supporting forces to the Armed Forces Act puts an end to any duality in control or allegiance and reinforces the dominance of the military institution over other formations that responded to the army commander’s call or sided during the war but were not all under a clear chain of command. This move is not to be read solely in its legal context; it is a proactive measure to ensure unified command and to shield the army from potential division.
Most importantly, these transformations coincide with leaked international reports—from within the U.S. administration—indicating that within three years, the Sudanese army will become the largest air and ground force in Africa and the Middle East. A high-level warning, leaked to former President Donald Trump’s office, refers to the “Sudanese Giant,” as the report describes it, supported by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, and potentially imposing a new deterrence equation in its African surroundings.
In light of this, Al-Burhan’s measures do not seem like mere internal arrangements; they are a precise engineering of the power theater, placing Sudan at the threshold of a new phase of military and political balance—locally, regionally, and internationally. Sudan today is no longer a worn-out state seeking a way out of chaos; rather, it appears—at least from a military planning perspective—to be laying the foundation for the post-war phase, or as the American report calls it: the phase of “the emergence of the Sudanese Giant.”
This transformation carries dimensions that go beyond military tactics; it is a shift in the philosophy of governance and administration, where the state is reconstituted from within its army, gradually shedding the weight of factions, militias, and weak political fronts. Al-Burhan realizes—more than ever—that his real battle is no longer just with the Rapid Support Forces militia, but with a regional and international political-military structure aiming to dismantle the Sudanese army and deprive it of cohesion, legitimacy, and sources of armament.
Perhaps in this context, we also understand the recent reported deal with Pakistan to purchase advanced fighter jets and radar systems; Sudan, under this equation, is moving beyond reliance on traditional markets and is now opening—according to a realistic and pragmatic approach—to alternative military manufacturing hubs, in Pakistan and elsewhere.
According to what we see from #Face_of_Truth, what is happening today within the Sudanese army is not just a reshuffling, internal arrangements, or even a correction of course. It is a complete redesign of the army’s identity, hierarchy, network of relations, and balance of internal influence. And above all, the clearest message remains that Al-Burhan has decided to engineer the military and political arena in a way that makes any surprises or reckless adventures impossible and reestablishes the state from its solid foundation: the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Wishing you all well and good health.
Tuesday, August 19, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com
